



Security Council

Distr.: General
3 November 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 2 November 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith Open Announcement No. 1 issued on 2 November 2010 by the Inspection Group of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the truth behind the *Cheonan* incident (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Sin Son Ho**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 2 November 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

***Cheonan* incident fabricated by the United States and the Lee Myung Bak group of traitors was most hideous conspiratorial farce in the nation's history**

Open Announcement No. 1 issued on 2 November 2010 in Pyongyang by the Inspection Group of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the truth behind the *Cheonan* incident

Seven months have passed since the *Cheonan* of the south Korean Navy sank in the West Sea of Korea.

No sooner had the incident occurred than the United States imperialists and the Lee Myung Bak group of traitors deliberately linked it with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as if they had waited for it to happen, kicking up an unprecedented anti-Democratic People's Republic of Korea confrontation racket.

From the outset, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dismissed the groundless story about its involvement in the *Cheonan* incident as a sheer fabrication and conspiratorial farce, and declared at home and abroad its will to probe the truth behind the case to the last.

The proposal for a field investigation made by the inspection group of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was prompted by this will.

Having grown afraid that the inside story of the case may be disclosed, the United States imperialists and the Lee group of traitors hastily announced the "results of the investigation" conducted by a "civilian-army joint investigation team", desperately opposing the field survey by the National Defence Commission inspection group.

As the "investigation results" were criticized for being full of suspicions, they recently made public a "final report", another fabrication, only to be censured and ridiculed by all people.

They have gone so far as to stage joint naval exercises in the form of a "demonstration of armed forces" one after another in the waters close to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea while getting frantic with a racket for applying sanctions against it in the international arena.

It was the original plan of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side to make public the truth about the incident in the most scientific and legitimate manner after the completion of the field survey by the National Defence Commission inspection group.

The United States imperialists and the group of traitors, however, not only objected to the field survey but went the lengths of turning down even the proposal made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea out of magnanimity to jointly survey and estimate all material evidence which they claimed they had lifted from the waters where the ship sank after bringing them to Panmunjom.

Under this situation, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side decided to disclose before the world on the basis of information gathered so far what a sheer fabrication and conspiratorial farce they orchestrated. The following is the first instalment of the statement:

1. Aluminium alloy fragments prove that the torpedo was not from the north.

The United States imperialists and the "investigation team" of the Lee group of traitors claimed that the fragments of torpedo allegedly lifted from the waters off Paengnyong Islet where the *Cheonan* sank were those of aluminium alloy.

They made public that the aluminium alloy was material evidence proving that the "torpedo was from the north" and that the "north attacked the ship".

The army and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have silently watched how the United States imperialists and the group of traitors would explain the issue of these torpedo fragments as they pretended to be well informed of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The army and people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have exercised patience with an intention to verify them on the spot and make public what they had in mind.

As it has become impossible to verify them on the spot, they now disclose the truth about the incident.

The Navy of the Korean People's Army has torpedoes as the naval forces of other countries do, and we do not hide the fact that it possesses torpedoes with such a tremendous striking power that the world can hardly imagine.

They are *Juche*-based torpedoes made of steel alloy material manufactured by the workers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, not aluminium alloy like those made in other countries.

It was our original intention to hand a steel alloy sample of a torpedo of the Navy of the Korean People's Army to the United States imperialists and the group of traitors so that they could compare it with aluminium alloy. It was aimed at inducing them to admit that the "attack on the *Cheonan* by the north's torpedo" was a sheer fabrication and conspiratorial farce.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is still willing to directly hand the steel alloy sample of *Juche*-based torpedo to the United States imperialists and the group of traitors.

The United States imperialists and the group of traitors have so far claimed that the aluminium alloy fragments were "those of the north's torpedo", and this is as good as denying the "story" themselves.

Here we would like to lay bare more glaringly the hypocrisy and the inside story about the anti-Democratic People's Republic of Korea conspiratorial scenarios, including several "investigation reports" which the United States and the south Korean puppets announced as regards the *Cheonan* incident.

2. Propelling body is a sheer fabrication.

The propelling body is one of the decisive pieces of evidence produced by the United States and the Lee Myung Bak group of traitors to prove the story that the "north was involved" in the *Cheonan* incident.

The origin of this propelling body is full of doubts.

It is nonsensical for them to claim that a civilian fishing boat appeared all of a sudden and netted the propelling body which dozens of naval vessels equipped with sophisticated detecting devices had failed to find in at least 50 days. The propelling body which was shown on television was different from the one the "investigation team" made public later.

The propelling body, which was lifted by the fishing boat at that time, was reported to have been pasted with silver paper, but there was no such thing on the 1.5 metre long propelling body presented by the puppet groups "investigation team" on 20 May.

This is not the only thing that aroused suspicion.

At the outset, the "investigation team" said that HMX, RDX and TNT explosive ingredients were detected from the hull of the *Cheonan*.

But there rose an opinion that no minute explosive ingredient was detected from the propelling body which they claimed had been used for sinking the vessel. It does not stand to reason that no gunpowder ingredient was detected from the torpedo which is to be exploded by gunpowder, i.e., from the propelling body of the torpedo which they claimed had been used for breaking the 1,400 ton class *Cheonan* into two.

Driven to a tight corner, the United States and the south Korean puppets excused themselves, saying that they could not detect the explosive ingredient as it was dissolved in seawater because the propelling body remained in the salty seawater for long. But this excuse can cut no ice as they had already made public that gunpowder ingredient was detected from the vessel's hull which remained on the bottom of the same waters for the same length of time.

3. Torpedo design, a mockery of the world.

A greater irony is that it was disclosed that the torpedo design shown by the group of traitors in a bid to convince the public that the torpedo propelling body was "from the north" was full of suspicions.

When making public the "joint investigation results", the puppet group shamelessly displayed at the venue of the news conference a CHT-02D torpedo design it claimed had been drawn by the north so as to make plausible its assertion that the propelling body of the torpedo which had attacked the vessel was "made by the north". It insisted it was certain that the propelling body was made by the north as "Guaranteed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" was written on the literature of the torpedo design.

However, the words written on the design were confirmed to be Japanese in fact, and it was brought to light that the torpedo motor on the design was a rectangular one, and the motor of the propelling body produced at the venue of the news conference was of a streamlined shape.

When their clumsy plot proved to be false, they could not but admit that they had given the explanation with the help of a different torpedo design so as to confirm the story of the "propelling body from the north".

The falsity of the design is proved by the following facts: the puppet group claimed in its "report on the results of the joint investigation" that it was a "design contained in north Korea's torpedo literature distributed for export", and it was "provided with the image of the CHT-02D torpedo by the information analysing section". The part just under it referred to the "process of printing the north's words in computer by printer", hinting that it was a computer file. This fact alone proves that whether the design is a printed matter or an image or a computer file remains uncertain.

It had already been disclosed that the puppet group replaced the torpedo design by a new one in secrecy several times in a bid to convince the public at any cost that the propelling body was "from the north".

This goes to prove that the propelling body produced by the United States and the south Korean puppet group as strong evidence of a "torpedo attack by the north" was nothing but a sheer fabrication making a mockery of the world.

4. Writing style of "No. 1", a vivid manifestation of ignorance.

The United States and the south Korean puppets cited the writing style of "No. 1" written on the propelling body as decisive evidence.

The munitions industry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not use pen when writing any necessary figures on any parts or equipment but carves them, and in this case they use the Korean word *Ho*, not *Pon* (number). In a word, "No. 1" is not a conventional writing style used in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Moreover, had the vessel been sunk by a torpedo attack, not only the head of the torpedo, which caused the explosion, but also its propelling body would have been seriously destroyed due to the high temperature and pressure which occurred during the explosion. Therefore, it is nonsensical that "No. 1" remains vivid as if it had just been written on the propelling body.

When one has a look at the back part of the propelling body and the rudder of the torpedo presented by the puppet "investigation team", one can judge that their surfaces are heavily corroded.

A torpedo is painted to prevent it from being corroded before its use. The paint is burned up due to high heat during its explosion and its remains are corroded in the seawater.

Then there arises a question as to at what temperature the paint on the torpedo is burned.

It is a view of the relevant scientists that generally the boiling point of the paint of silicon and ceramic varieties, which can stand the highest temperature, is 760° C and the boiling point of ordinary oil paint is 350° C-500° C.

Supposing that 250 kg of explosives were used to attack the vessel as claimed by the puppet "investigation team", the temperature of the back part of the propelling body of the torpedo should be at least 325° C and at most over 1,000° C right after its explosion, in view of the amount of energy to be generated at that moment.

When taking into consideration the fact that the outer rudder at the edge of the back part of the torpedo remained corroded, its inside might have been heated above the said temperature, and the temperature inside the back part of the propelling body on which "No. 1" was written might have been as high as 325° C-1,000° C.

But "No. 1" was written by something like felt-tip pen, not by paint.

The ink usually used for felt-tip pens worldwide is made up of xylene, toluene and alcohol. The boiling points of these ingredients are known to be 138.5° C for xylene, 110.6° C for toluene and 78.4° C for alcohol. So, the ink used on the back part of the propelling body might have been burned up at the temperature of 300° C.

If the outer paint is burned up, the characters "No. 1" written with felt-tip pen should be burned up, and if the characters are left, the outer paint should also remain. This is a science.

However, the outer paint that stands high temperature was burned up, but the inner ink that burns up even in low temperature remains intact. With no rhetoric, can the puppet group justify this inconsistency?

It is quite natural that many people said it was hardly understandable in the light of common sense why there were no similar characters on the other parts of the propelling body of the torpedo, if this was written by the north for the purpose of assembling the torpedo.

The characters "No. 1" only betrayed the lack of scientific knowledge and ignorance of plot-breeders, far from proving that the torpedo was made by the north.

A maritime expert conducted a personal experiment on the spot, and scientifically proved the fact that the surface of the part on which the characters were written was clearer than other parts as it was grinded by abrasive paper for writing new characters and the propelling body had never been in the seawater after "No. 1" was written on it.

University professors of the United States and Canada made a precision analysis of the ink used for writing the characters "No. 1" and officially confirmed that it is identical with what is used in south Korea, driving the tricksters into an inescapable tight corner.

Everywhere in south Korea, one can still hear such boos and jeers as that "buses bearing blue 'No. 1' and running in the streets are the ones from the north for intruding into the south", "players in uniform with a blue 'No. 1' on the playgrounds are players from the north" and "a nephew who has the same writing style as that used for writing the characters 'No. 1' is also a spy from the north". This clearly proves how ridiculous the evidence proving "No. 1" is.

5. "Story about a column of water", a false statement made under coercion.

Right after the occurrence of the vessel incident, experts expressed their respective assertions and views on the cause of the incident, saying that "it was stranded", "it was destroyed for its natural age", "it was sunk by a mine explosion", "it was sunk by the explosion of its ammunition chamber", etc.

But the United States and the south Korean puppets floated the "story about a column of water" in a bid to brush aside the above-said assertions and convince the public at any cost that the "vessel was sunk by the north's torpedo attack".

If the vessel was sunk by a torpedo attack, there would naturally be a column of water. Therefore, the "story about a column of water" drew the attention of the public, keen to clarify the cause of the incident.

But the results of the analysis of the testimonies made by the crew of the vessel and the soldiers who were on duty in the waters near the vessel right after the incident proved that there was no one who witnessed the column of water. Then, all of a sudden, it was reported that a watchman on Paengnyong Islet said he had witnessed a column of water. He was reported to have said that, at the sound of a bang, he had looked at the waters at 270 degrees of declination about 4 km away from his position, and then saw a white light that flashed and disappeared.

But when the location where he claimed he had seen the column of water was compared with the position where he was standing on duty, it is evident that it was a place quite different from the scene of the incident; worse still, what he had witnessed was nothing but a "white light flash".

No one out of the 58 survivors of the incident said he had witnessed a column of water, light flash and flame that would happen at the time when a vessel is attacked by a torpedo. The results of the examination of the dead by X-ray and other means showed that there was no trace of wounds caused by splinters or burns, except bone fracture, lacerated wounds, etc.

That fact generally suggested that there was a small possibility that they died due to external injuries and suffocation, but they drowned in the waters.

To support the "story of a column of water", the puppet "investigation team" emphasized that there were drops of water on the face of a port watcher and there was much seawater on the vessel, but this only has become a target of ridicule.

A soldier who survived the incident had this to say: "At that time I was on duty watching the starboard of the vessel. I did not notice anything in particular like a column of water when I looked around." This statement flatly refuted the "story of a column of water" spread by the puppet group.

This fact proves that the above-said "story of a column of water" was deliberately fabricated by the upper echelon of the puppet military to convince the public that the vessel was sunk by the "north's torpedo attack".

6. "Course of channel style infiltration", an assertion of the blind.

The United States and the south Korean puppet group invented the story about "the course of channel style infiltration" by the north's submarine into the said waters in a bid to prove that the *Cheonan* was sunk by a torpedo attack of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Right after the occurrence of the incident, the United States and the south Korean puppet military authorities asserted that there was no mysterious movement of the Korean People's Army before and after the incident.

Later they published what they called "investigation results", in which they claimed some mini-submarines and certain supporting vessel of the Korean People's Army Navy were confirmed to have left a certain base in the West Sea of Korea two to three days before the incident and returned two to three days later.

What matters is that there is neither a single mini-sub in that base touted by the puppet group nor any shadow of something similar to it.

The puppet group insisted that a submarine sailed towards the international waters in the west after loading a torpedo at the said base, and veered to the south before sailing to the east to infiltrate in channel style close to the waters off Paengnyong Islet.

There should be a limit to cooking up a lie.

When the public demanded correct materials proving the story, the puppet group categorically objected to it at the outset, claiming that it could not confirm it for fear of exposing the level of army intelligence-gathering with regard to the information on the movement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea submarine. But, unable to turn down the public demand any longer, it uttered it could not show the image as its quality was poor because of bad weather.

In other words, the puppet group admitted itself that it failed to monitor any movement due to poor quality of image.

The puppet group had boasted that it discerns submarines on the basis of the observation data obtained by the south Korea-United States joint intelligence gathering machinery, and that the credibility of the round-the-clock observation of the related area by the United States cutting-edge intelligence satellite is very high as it is based on the precision image data with a resolution of less than one metre. It is sheer abstraction for the puppet group to talk about "the course of channel style infiltration", while asserting that it could not produce correct observation results because of "poor image quality" one or two days before and after the outbreak of the incident.

The observation was not affected by weather for some days before and after the occurrence of the incident. Its assertion about impossible observation only goes to prove that its story about the infiltration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea submarine was no more than a farce of its own making to bury it in a "black box".

7. Aluminium adsorbent scientifically rejected.

The United States and the south Korean puppet group even presented the analysis of an adsorbent which they said was found on the hull and torpedo parts as scientific evidence, proving the vessel's sinking by torpedo explosion. They asserted that as the large quantity of white powder found on the torpedo propelling body was of the same component as those found on several places of the hull, it could be concluded that the vessel was sunk by a torpedo attack.

A precision analysis conducted by prestigious physicists of several countries, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea categorically dismissed this assertion.

The puppet "investigation team" claimed that the aluminium used for making a torpedo turns into non-crystalline aluminium oxide when it explodes and cools, and that non-crystalline aluminium oxide is detected as aluminium in energy spectroscopy and not as aluminium in X-ray diffraction analysis.

Physicists of several countries including the United States and Canada refuted the above-said claim, saying that it is impossible that aluminium turns into non-crystalline aluminium oxide 100 per cent after undergoing explosion and cooling and explained that the probability of all aluminium turning into oxide is close to 0 per cent and the probability of all oxidized aluminium turning into non-crystalline is also close to 0 per cent. They gave a particular explanation proving that the adsorbent found on the hull and torpedo propelling body asserted by the puppet "investigation team" are hardly produced at high temperatures like at the time of explosion, unlike non-crystalline aluminium oxide, a product of explosion, as they are formed in normal and low temperatures. To scientifically prove this, those physicists analysed and verified the adsorbent by various means such as X-ray diffraction, energy spectroscopy, infrared ray spectroscopy, laser spectroscopy and even with the help of an electronic microscope. They even conducted a direct experiment on it and proposed an open experiment to the puppet "investigation team".

Physicists of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shared the view with those physicists.

The puppet group, which could not respond to the proposal, let loose such poor excuses that only oxidized, non-crystalline aluminium, not oxidized crystalline aluminium, was detected in the initial examination because it was present in a minimum amount, only to deny the scientific data and assertion made by themselves.

The mock explosion of the hull and torpedo and the analysis of the resultant adsorbent, which the puppet group had so far claimed to be the most scientific of the investigation results, only proved that they tried to justify the investigation results in a far-fetched manner, unaware of even the scientific truth that aluminium does not turn into non-crystalline oxide 100 per cent through explosion.

8. Port screw and fluorescent lamps in good shape.

The puppet group staged such a farce as inviting people from all walks of life to look around the vessel in the puppet Navy's 2nd Fleet base, in a bid to link the incident with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. But this added to its worry.

Those who looked around the lifted vessel cast more doubts on the case instead of understanding the explanation given by the puppet group. This is because there took place a non-contact underwater explosion on the port of the vessel, but the port screw remained in good shape and the starboard screw was seriously deformed, and fluorescent lamps in the part of the hull broken into two pieces were as they had been.

The witnesses ridiculed that they have never seen a torpedo with such a super-precision striking power capable of breaking only a vessel into two pieces while leaving fluorescent lamps very close to the part where the explosion took place as they are, asserting that these fluorescent lamps should be licensed as "magic fluorescent lamps" and "bullet-proof fluorescent lamps" that could withstand a torpedo explosion.

As a matter of fact, the deformation of the screw provides core testimony to the fact that the *Cheonan* was sunk without external factors. What is most important is to clear the basic doubts, but the puppet group gave no explanation to this matter.

When arguments gained in scope and strength, the puppet Ministry of Defence ambiguously spoke about the results of the analysis of the screw deformation and let loose a spate of sophism that there is no reason to assert that glass fluorescent lamps should be broken when the hull was broken in two, claiming that the fluorescent lamps of the naval vessels were made to stand any shock.

The above-said port screw and fluorescent lamps provided decisive evidence refuting the assertion by the United States and the puppet group that the vessel was sunk by a "torpedo attack of the north".

9. Evidence proving the vessel's stranding.

The biggest controversy this time was whether the warship was sunk by a torpedo attack or due to stranding.

The puppet group opened to the media the bow and stern of the vessel, to which they had been barred from getting access, to convince them that the vessel was sunk by a torpedo attack.

As regards this issue, experts asserted that all the information about the *Cheonan* incident clearly proved that it had been stranded, adding that the "joint investigation team" committed a serious mistake when analysing the cause of the incident.

First of all, the waters where the bow of the warship was found are the waters between Paengnyong Islet and Taechong Islet, which abound in rocks.

The torn part outside the port security guard of the stern, the bending of the left side of the security guard and the serious scratching on the framework of the hull and the security guard can be usually found when the hull is hit by a rock or sand ground.

If there were damage done by a torpedo attack, the vessel would have neither been partly torn off nor got rusty.

The experts who asserted that the vessel had been stranded contend that if the vessel had been sunk by the pressure of a non-contact underwater explosion, which would cause contraction and swelling, the security guard would have been broken or blown up. They termed this a reasonable suspicion as regards the fact that the security guard was in perfect shape although the right propeller of the stern became bent.

The puppet group labelled such reasonable suspicion as a "strange story" and "enemy-benefiting act" to cope with the reasonable assertion through a poor colour theory. However, it could not hide the truth.

Had the torpedo exploded near the *Cheonan* as claimed by the "investigation team", a lot of fragments must have been embedded in the vessel body. But there was no fragment on the vessel, there was no one among the vessel's crew who got his eardrum ruptured and joints hurt, and no dead fish could be seen on the surface of the water. The results of the analysis of the thermal observation device (TOD) image made public by the puppet Ministry of Defence and the coordinates presented

by the "investigation team", and the coordinates of the automated tactical command system of the puppet Navy, showed that the *Cheonan* continued to sail north-west even after the time it had sunk, time confirmed by the "investigation team". That the vessel continued to sail against the current even after it had been broken in two by a torpedo attack denies the story that the vessel was sunk by a torpedo attack. Survivors testified to the fact that they had felt the vessel hit something with the sounds of "bang" and "boom" before rising and smelled burning oil. This fact went to prove the vessel's stranding.

It is by no means accidental that experts had home and abroad assert that a comprehensive analysis of the propelling power unit of the torpedo which was claimed to have been lifted from the waters where the vessel sank, the deformation of the hull, the content of the testimonies made by those related to the case, the conditions of the wounded and the autopsy of the dead, an analysis of seismic wave and air sound wave, the simulated underwater explosion, an analysis of the tide near Paengnyong Islet, an analysis of explosive ingredients, the retrieved torpedo parts, etc. can prove that there was no short-distance non-contact underwater explosion, that the propelling body had nothing to do with the destruction of the *Cheonan*, and that there is no evidence proving that the torpedo was from "the north".

10. Video file disappeared before being made public.

The "investigation results" announced by the puppet group said that a CHT-02D torpedo with an explosive power of 250 kg of TNT went off three metres portside from the gas turbine room of the vessel and in waters 6 to 9 metres deep, giving off "shock waves and a non-contact underwater explosion effect" that resulted finally in breaking the vessel in two.

The "shock waves" that caused the most serious direct damage to the vessel gave a shock to the hull at a speed of 8,000 metres per second.

Had the torpedo produced such powerful shock waves approximately 3 metres off the hull as announced by the puppet group, 1.1 seconds would have been enough to completely cut off the vessel.

An animation file showing a mock "non-contact underwater explosion" of a heavy torpedo, conducted by the puppet Institute for Defence Studies in 2004, proved that a Paeksango torpedo with an explosive power equivalent to that of 185 kg of TNT completely split the hull into two pieces in less than one second after its explosion. In more than 10 seconds after the explosion a water column scores of metres high disappeared and the bow was observed scores of metres away from the stern. Thirty seconds after the explosion it was hardly possible to find any trace of the hull on the water surface.

This suffices to prove that the *Cheonan* must have completely sunk or its bow separated from its stern after about 30 seconds if it had been hit by a CHT-02D torpedo with an explosive power of 250 kg of TNT, much stronger than that of a Paeksango torpedo.

The puppet Ministry of Defence, which had refused to disclose the navigation diary and sonar details, was compelled to make public a TOD video file showing the waters where the vessel had sunk; only the scenes showing the explosion of the vessel and the split of the hull were missing.

Then where has the video file gone showing the full at the moment of the split, which can serve as decisive evidence proving the cause of the vessel's sinking?

Right after the incident, the puppet Ministry of Defence presented to the public the scenes showing the *Cheonan* in its normal operation before the explosion, its bow and stern that were split after explosion and the sinking of the bow. It insisted that the TOD record of the most crucial moment showing the split of the bow and stern was not available. However, it could not but disclose an additional video file two times in the face of public criticism. This only aroused greater suspicion.

This TOD video file dealt with what happened between 32 seconds and 40 seconds after the alleged explosion of the vessel.

This video file lasting eight seconds showed the funnel of the vessel as a black spot and its starboard side tilted towards Paengnyong Islet with the bow and stern not completely split.

The scientific experiment made by the puppet group and common sense suggest that, had the vessel been sunk by a torpedo, nothing should have been shown above the surface of the water 32 seconds after the explosion.

Much upset by this, the puppet Ministry of Defence made poor excuses, saying that "scenes are blurred as the TOD focus was set at the low triple magnification" and that "it is hard to discern the split vessel's body though it was broken into two pieces because resolution was low".

At the very outset it concealed this file, talking about military secret, and corrected its assertions three times. But the results proved that the vessel was not sunk by a torpedo attack. It is clear why this video file had been missing.

II. Unreasonable measurement of the corrosion period.

The falsity of the "investigation results" presented by the United States and the south Korean puppet group can be seen through their measurement of the corrosion period of the propelling body of the torpedo.

At the time when the puppet group announced the "midterm investigation results", they said that they could not measure the correct corrosion period as a great deflection between the quality and corrosion later of the metal of the propelling body was observed in the course of measuring them, adding that members of the "investigation team" estimated with naked eyes that it was similar to the state of one to two months' corrosion.

What matters is why the corrosion period of metal could only be measured with naked eyes.

There is a need to investigate the experiment results announced by a marine expert of south Korea.

He put heated aluminium, stainless steel and iron pieces in the waters with a salinity and tide similar to those of the waters where the vessel had been sunk, before taking them out in order to scientifically clarify the state of corrosion of the vessel.

The results showed that they were not as heavily rusted as the propelling body and, particularly, white adsorbent was found in some parts of the aluminium piece

but some heated parts appeared to be dark. This stood in sharp contrast to the adsorbent found on the propeller of the propelling body which had been made public by the puppet "investigation team".

The same can be said of the iron piece. It was rusted dark, but when it was placed in the air after the dark rust was rubbed off, it turned yellow. This can be compared to the shaft of the propelling body which was rusted red; in other words, the propelling body was rusted more heavily.

Some parts of the stainless steel piece were observed to be dark, but no corrosion was found.

The expert noted that the propelling body presented by the "joint investigation team" to prove a torpedo attack by the north gathered a preposterously great amount of rust, adding that it must have been underwater for a least four to five years and then put in the air for a considerably long time.

The results of an investigation made by a Russian team said that one could judge from the scientific analysis and comparison between the rust formed on the vessel's hull and the rust formed on the propelling body with "No. 1" that the propelling body was under seawater for more than six months, adding that one can draw the conclusion that they have nothing in common.

Contained in the appendix to the "final report" made public by the puppet "investigation team" were EDS data proving that the adsorbent collected from the torpedo was not aluminium oxide caused by explosion, but aluminium hydroxide, rust caused by corrosion.

Foreign experts said that the data of energy dust ores, which formed when adsorbent was treated at 200° C, were contained in the "final report", even though they were not presented at the time of publication of the midterm investigation, noting in unison that as the results of the adsorbent experiment are identical to those of the heat treatment of aluminium hydroxide, it is contrary to the conclusion of the "final report" that adsorbent was produced by an explosion.

They even expressed their understanding that it can be interpreted that some scholars of conscience left such data in the "final report" full of deception and falsity.

In the final analysis, the puppet group revealed by themselves the unscientific and slack way the investigation was made through such a simple estimation as "examination with naked eyes", not a scientific and technological examination, and fully showed that the "story of the north's involvement" in the *Cheonan* incident was a sheer fabrication.

12. Simulated warship sinking invites derision.

The puppet group reportedly staged a simulated warship sinking allegedly to prove the warship sinking by torpedo explosion, with an aim to link the *Cheonan* incident with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The simulation overturned the investigation results the puppet group has so far announced.

From the outset, it declared that the explosive power of the torpedo was equivalent to that of 250 kg of TNT of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea heavy torpedo CHT-02D and, on this basis, presented investigation results.

The specification of the "No. 1 torpedo" made public by it defined the amount of powder as 250 kg. What matters is that the explosive power of such an amount of powder is not enough to sink the *Cheonan*.

In general, high-efficiency powder stronger than TNT is used in torpedoes.

Torpedo experts consider that torpedo explosive powder is 1.4 to 2 times stronger than ordinary TNT. This indicates that the explosive power of the "No. 1 torpedo" is as much as that of 350 to 500 kg of TNT.

The puppet group belatedly admitted the fact that the powder of the torpedo was not simply made up of TNT. And in order to correct its mistake, it increased the explosive power of the torpedo to that of 360 kg of TNT and staged another simulated underwater explosion. That was necessary to represent a likeness of the real damage caused by an explosion to the engine room and hull floor of the vessel.

The results of the simulation negated what happened at the time of the sinking of the vessel.

Negation of the explosion as powerful as that of 140 to 260 kg of TNT which was registered by the then seismic and air sound waves precisely means negation of the generation of shock and heat, the height of the column of water, the wounds suffered by the crew, the possibility of the existence of the characters "No. 1", the hull and inner powder chamber and all other places of the sunken vessel that remained undamaged by explosion-caused shock waves as well as all other points of contention based on explosive power produced by the puppets.

As regards the simulation, a member of the "investigation team" confessed that "they could not but work hard for about two months to modify and rectify a model". This indicates that the simulation was carried out for the purpose of a frame-up.

After all, the puppets' desperate efforts to fabricate the story about the *Cheonan* sinking by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea torpedo attack backfired on it.

13. "Final report" reduced to false indictment.

When the "interim report" published by the United States and the south Korean puppet group on 20 May was snubbed and rebuffed by the public inside and outside Korea, they presented the "final report" on 13 September after the lapse of more than 100 days, talking about the removal of all suspicions which had been raised so far.

The "final report", however, touched off stronger suspicion, only to prove that the group of traitors made an empty talk when it promised to clear off the suspicion.

The puppet group just confined itself to such work as recording the course and contents of the investigation and the analysis data, including the investigation activities carried out according to schedule unlike at the time of issuing the primary presentation, which preponderantly analysed the cause of the sinking of the *Cheonan*, and even deleted the part that they could not explain though there arose strong suspicion.

The puppet group again presented the torpedo propelling body, which it claimed had been lifted from the waters where the *Cheonan* sank, as material evidence proving the "story about the attack on the *Cheonan* by the north's torpedo", a story that sparked off the strongest suspicion. But it failed to present the direct evidence proving that the propelling body is "from the north" and, as for the characters "No. 1", "design of torpedo", etc., it only repeated previous assertions.

The south Korean media, deploring who would believe the unsubstantial "final report" full of "indirect evidence", said that it is quite natural that more than 70 per cent of the south Korean people "suspect that the authorities have deliberately distorted the truth to seek the political purpose or evade responsibility" and the remaining people disbelieve or are doubtful about it, as the investigation conducted for many days after inviting so many experts only increased and reproduced the doubtful points as to the cause of the sinking of the vessel, far from presenting perfect evidence.

In fact, people from south Korean political, public, scientific and other circles are holding emergency seminars, expressing their will to probe the truth about the incident to the last.

It is by no means fortuitous that the Russian investigation group, the only group which investigated the case on the spot, said as regards the sinking of the vessel that "it could find no grounds to judge that it was caused by the torpedo attack by the north". The Swedish investigation group which participated in the joint investigation officially held back its opinion that "it was the deed of the mini-submarine of the north" and different countries of the world are demanding the reinvestigation of the incident, expressing doubts at the "investigation results".

The media of Russia, Germany, China, the United States and other countries dismissed the "final report on the *Cheonan*" announced by the south Korean authorities as the worst false document.

Much upset by the shower of criticism and denunciation, the tricksters let loose a spate of groundless outbursts, advising those who were strongly suspicious of the case to "look at a cartoon recording the points of suspicion and contention to get understanding".

Talking about the "limitation of detectability" in the present times in which detection is made down to the level of a nanogram is little short of self-admission that falsity can never prevail over truth. And the substitution of a scientific and technological solution with a cartoon only proves the level of baseness of the artifice employed by the tricksters.

The Lee Myung Bak group of traitors fabricated the *Cheonan* incident while sacrificing a great many soldiers to escalate the confrontation racket. It only glaringly disclosed its heinous nature as the group of traitors unprecedented in the nation's history, the vicious confrontation-minded elements and the despicable sycophantic traitors serving the United States.

The United States egged its stooges on to fabricate the conspiratorial case against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, self-proving before the world that it is a matchless "producer" in this field and has committed another fraud to serve its strategic interests in the Far Eastern region, the Northeast Asian region.

There is a lot of information proving the falsity of the investigation results about the *Cheonan* incident announced by the United States and the group of traitors.

We will issue the second and third instalments of the statement to prove the truth behind the conspiratorial farce and charade in the face of the frantic racket kicked up by the United States and the group of traitors to escalate confrontation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea while making a fuss about the *Cheonan* incident.

The United States and the Lee Myung Bak group of traitors will never be able to escape the sledge-hammer blow of the times and history for their hideous frame-up unprecedented in the history of the Korean nation.



Security Council

Distr.: General
2 November 2010

Original: English

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

Letter dated 2 November 2010 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism I have the honour to submit the report on the activities and achievements of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate from 2008 to 2010 and recommendations for future activities (see annex) as part of the comprehensive consideration by the Council prior to the expiration of the mandate of the Executive Directorate in accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1805 (2008).

The Committee would appreciate if this letter, together with the report, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Ertuğrul Apakan
Chairman

Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism



Annex

Report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to the Counter-Terrorism Committee on the activities and achievements of the Executive Directorate from 2008 to 2010 and recommendations for future activities

I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, in paragraph 2 of its resolution 1805 (2008), decided that the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate would continue to operate as a special political mission under the policy guidance of the Counter-Terrorism Committee for the period ending 31 December 2010, and decided to conduct an interim review by 30 June 2009 and a comprehensive consideration of the Executive Directorate's work prior to the expiration of its mandate. The Council conducted an interim review of the work of the Executive Directorate in June 2009.

2. The present report, drawing upon the conclusions of the interim review of June 2009, summarizes the achievements of the Executive Directorate during its current mandate and offers a number of recommendations as to how the Executive Directorate might better assist States in their future implementation of Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). The report takes into account both the recent evolution of the global terrorist threat and the generally enhanced understanding of good counter-terrorism practices by national and international practitioners. The Executive Directorate hopes that the report will be of assistance to the Committee in its task of advising the Security Council on whether, and in what terms, the mandate of the Executive Directorate should be renewed in December 2010.

II. Implementation of the structural reorganization of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

3. The Counter-Terrorism Committee, in its June 2009 interim review (see S/2009/289), noted that the 2008 reorganizational plan, which involved the creation of five technical groups and two smaller units to operate across the existing structure of three geographical clusters, had served the Executive Directorate well, enhancing its capacity to conduct its core business of engaging with Member States on their implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). It attributed two particular achievements over the period to the new more flexible structure: the production of the global implementation survey and the development of the technical guide to the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001).

4. This structure has continued to serve the Executive Directorate and the Committee well. The groups and the clusters were both closely involved in the production of a first revision of the global implementation survey, and have, over the past 12 months or so, delivered a series of technical briefings to the Committee and to the full membership of the United Nations. The briefings have helped to make the work of the Committee and the Executive Directorate, more transparent to the broader United Nations membership. The technical groups have also served to establish consistency in judgements by clusters regarding determinations of how

well States, regions and subregions have implemented specific elements of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). The clusters, for their part, have continued to play an important role in engaging with Member States on assessments and technical assistance facilitation, and enhancing their understanding of the work of the Committee and the Executive Directorate.

III. Preparation of preliminary implementation assessments and stocktaking exercise

5. Since 2008, the Executive Directorate has prepared, and the Committee has adopted, preliminary implementation assessments for all United Nations Member States and has helped the Committee to conduct a first review, or stocktaking, of more than half of those States. This stocktaking exercise has enabled the Committee to deepen its active dialogue with Member States; to learn where States continue to face particular challenges; and, more generally, to gain a better and more detailed understanding of the state of implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) across the globe. The Executive Directorate has been able to use this stocktaking process to arrange video workshops with a number of late-reporting States (almost a dozen) and thereby engage in the capital with a range of agencies that otherwise it would not be able to reach.

6. At the same time the stocktaking is a resource-intensive exercise both for the Executive Directorate and for Committee members, so the Committee adopted, early in 2010, a simplified procedure for the consideration of the preliminary implementation assessments. However, in view of the growth in the range of other activities through which the Committee and the Executive Directorate engage with Member States, consideration might be given to conducting the stocktaking process over a longer time period.

7. As indicated in the interim report, the Committee plans to review the format of the preliminary implementation assessment in order to enhance its usefulness as a diagnostic tool. The Executive Directorate will in due course draft, in consultation with Committee members and for the Committee's consideration, proposals for revitalizing the preliminary implementation assessment on the basis of the technical guide.

IV. Country visits

8. The revised organizational plan for the Executive Directorate, endorsed by the Committee in February 2008, envisaged a more flexible approach to assessment missions, in particular, first, by allowing the Executive Directorate to contemplate shorter visits focused on one or two particular aspects of the counter-terrorism regime of the Member State concerned, and second, by opening the way for regional visits and missions aimed at considering good practices. As a result, the Executive Directorate has since been able to visit some 36 States, bringing the total number of States visited and assessed since 2005 to 59 (including follow-up visits to two States). The Executive Directorate believes that these visits still constitute an essential part of its work and are key to its understanding of how States are evolving their counter-terrorism responses. A list of States that the Executive Directorate

proposes to visit during the next two to three years will shortly be submitted to the Committee for its consideration.

9. Having achieved, as a result of the range of assessment visits, a greater understanding of counter-terrorism activities in more than 25 per cent of Member States, the Executive Directorate has a more comprehensive sense of the ongoing counter-terrorism challenges in all regions of the world. This improved understanding helps to inform and shape the global implementation survey, a document that is becoming more detailed and consistent across regions, thereby becoming more useful to practitioners and analysts within and outside Governments in many parts of the world. Importantly, this enhanced knowledge also helps the Executive Directorate to determine priorities for its regional and subregional activities and its technical assistance facilitation.

V. Major ongoing challenges for States

10. Many States face problems in achieving comprehensive implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), owing to a lack of financial resources and infrastructure, inadequate human resources and competing developmental priorities. Significantly improved implementation will therefore be possible only if States are able to build basic infrastructure and develop the capacity of their national agencies to implement their mandates fully. Even in those States, the Executive Directorate has observed that attention to four key areas of government — strengthening border control systems; building the capacity of criminal justice systems to ensure operation of the rule of law; improving coordination and information-sharing among relevant national agencies; and strengthening institutional cooperation across borders with neighbouring States — appear to have a very significant impact on counter-terrorism capabilities. This is true even where development in other sectors remains otherwise relatively limited.

11. The Executive Directorate has also noted that approaches to counter-terrorism that are founded on the rule of law tend to be more successful and enduring. Moreover, if law enforcement, border control and similar strategies are integrated into a broader, overarching counter-terrorism strategy that addresses societal tensions and other “conditions conducive to terrorism”, through appropriate social, educational and cultural programmes, those strategies will be far more effective, as they tend to involve and engage key community players.

VI. Implications for the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

12. The above observations are increasingly informing the Executive Directorate’s programme of work and activities, as well as the focus of its technical assistance facilitation. For example, the series of South Asia workshops for police and prosecutors, which began in November 2009 and will continue for the next few years, are aimed not merely at enhancing the technical skills of participants from the eight participating South Asian States, but also seek to build a network that will link counter-terrorism professionals across borders in a region that has suffered grievously from terrorism.

13. Similarly, the workshop on enhancing border management held in Nairobi in June 2010 and the relevant follow-up activities are aimed not only at building skills in the field of immigration and Customs control, but also at demonstrating the value of strengthened coordination and information exchange between the eight or nine relevant national border-management agencies in each country. They also reinforce the critical importance of promoting more effective cooperation among neighbouring States to help them better share and exchange information in this field.

14. The Executive Directorate also recognizes that, in view of the need for greater cooperation among neighbouring States, regional and subregional approaches have the potential to act as force-multipliers of our work. Therefore, the Executive Directorate increasingly prefers such approaches to those that involve one State only. For very much the same reason, the Executive Directorate has actively sought to expand and broaden its cooperation with the relevant regional and subregional institutions. As an example, it has continued to develop its relationship with the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism, not only because that institution is engaged in counter-terrorism training in a region where capacities are low, but also because the Centre, through its training programmes and its associated website, is building habits of cooperation among professionals in States throughout Africa.

15. The Executive Directorate obviously does not have the capacity to deliver training to all African States but, through its facilitation role and through its relationships with a growing number of donors, it can promote such training through regional or subregional institutions and, in some cases (such as the Nairobi workshop), become a catalyst for more sustained training in needed fields. Similar examples may be found with respect to the work of the Executive Directorate in parts of Europe, Latin America, and South and Central Asia.

VII. Technical assistance

16. The Executive Directorate's approach to technical assistance facilitation has evolved over the past three years. As noted above, this approach is informed by its increased understanding of ongoing counter-terrorism challenges, an understanding gained from its active dialogue with States, including within the framework of its country assessment visits. The Executive Directorate continues to make specific technical assistance referrals related to needs identified in visited States. It does so on a targeted basis to donors judged to be receptive, whether that is because they are engaged in existing programmes in a particular State or because they have a strong interest and capability in a relevant technical area. Since the introduction of the revised strategy in 2008, the Executive Directorate has made 187 such referrals, of which 43 have led to final delivery of technical assistance by bilateral or multilateral donors.

17. Increasingly, however, the Executive Directorate has taken either a regional or a thematic approach to technical assistance facilitation, as these approaches better reflect the value that a Security Council body can add to this field. Several examples of the regional approach, such as the South Asian police and prosecutors workshops and the Nairobi border management workshop, have already been noted. Another example is provided by the efforts of the Executive Directorate to facilitate the establishment of a law enforcement training centre in South Asia. Those efforts have

involved a great deal of liaison with donors, negotiations with the host State, and outreach to other States in the region aimed at encouraging regional support. A further example is the Executive Directorate's work with relevant subregional bodies and donors to hold a workshop on cooperation for criminal justice professionals in South-East Europe in October 2010.

18. An example of a thematic approach to addressing technical assistance needs is the workshop for prosecutors of terrorist cases, to be held in New York early in December 2010. The workshop will bring together practising prosecutors from jurisdictions representing all the world's major regions and legal systems to share their experiences in prosecuting terrorist cases, and, more particularly, to identify the problems posed by such cases and seek ways to resolve them. The Executive Directorate expects that participants will also identify relevant training and other needs and that relevant donors, who will participate as observers, will be in a position to respond to those needs. A further example is the work of the Executive Directorate on an initiative aimed at identifying ways to protect charities from exploitation by terrorist groups, that will be launched at an experts meeting to be held in the United Kingdom in January 2011.

VIII. Engagement with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and other Security Council bodies

19. The Executive Directorate continues to serve as a core member of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, contributing in particular to the work of four working groups, dealing respectively with countering terrorist financing, human rights and counter-terrorism, the integrated assistance for countering terrorism initiative (in which the Executive Directorate acts as co-Chair) and, most recently, border control (on which the Executive Directorate acts as coordinator). In addition, Executive Directorate officers maintain frequent contact and interaction with the recently established permanent secretariat of the Task Force, sharing information on planned and completed activities and providing advice and technical support as needed. The Chair of the Task Force has a standing invitation to attend all internal work coordination meetings of the Executive Directorate, and does so regularly, and the Executive Directorate, in turn, attends management meetings of the Task Force secretariat.

20. The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force provides an effective mechanism for better coordinating technical assistance proposals made by various entities or referred to donors for funding. The integrated assistance initiative's database of technical assistance needs and programmes offers considerable promise in this respect. Over the longer term, stronger system-wide technical assistance coordination will likely be a key role of the Task Force secretariat and one in which the Executive Directorate would be well suited to assist.

21. The Task Force also provides a useful framework within which the three expert groups of the Security Council subsidiary bodies dealing with counter-terrorism (the Executive Directorate, the Monitoring Team of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) and the Expert Group of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)), can better coordinate their activities and continue to share information. Of course, such cooperation was under way, at all levels, well before the Task Force was

established. It has notably been manifested through the multiple "reporting" workshops that have been conducted by the three expert bodies, with the help of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in five regions or subregions over the past three years, as well as through the adoption by the three expert bodies of two common strategies, for engaging with late-submitting States and with international and regional organizations, respectively. In addition, the Monitoring Team has participated in a total of nine Executive Directorate assessment missions since 2008 and intends to continue this practice whenever the visit is relevant to its work. The experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) are also considering joining future Executive Directorate assessment missions, as appropriate.

IX. Engagement with international, regional and subregional organizations

22. The Executive Directorate continues to rely heavily on a number of key partner international organizations to provide expert assistance, advice and support (including, on occasion, logistical and funding support); for assistance with assessment missions, conferences and workshops; and for the provision of technical assistance pursuant to Executive Directorate referrals. The partners include the Terrorism Prevention Branch and the Global Programme against Money-Laundering of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Customs Organization and the World Bank.

23. As noted above, the Executive Directorate has also established particularly strong relations with certain regional and subregional organizations, including, inter alia, the Caribbean Community and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization of American States, in the Americas; the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism, the African Union, the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money-Laundering Group, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the IGAD Capacity-Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT), the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa and the Southern Africa Development Community, in Africa; the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money-Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, the Council of Europe, the European Union, Eurojust, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States, in Europe; the Pacific Islands Forum, in the Pacific; and the Asian Development Bank, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, in Asia.

24. Specific examples of cooperation during the reporting period include work with ICAO, UNHCR and regional bodies to facilitate assistance to States that are not currently issuing ICAO-compliant machine-readable travel documents; work with INTERPOL to create an international database of lost or stolen firearms, to be incorporated into the I-24/7 police global secure communications system; the hosting, together with ICPAT, of a workshop on regional border security in Uganda;

the hosting, together with the World Bank, of a counter-financing of terrorism workshop for members of the Pakistan National Parliament in Islamabad; and the hosting, together with IOM, of the border-management workshop in Nairobi.

X. Human rights

25. The Executive Directorate staff includes one Senior Human Rights Adviser, who is responsible for ensuring that human rights considerations are appropriately taken into account in the ongoing dialogue with Member States on the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). Moreover, as part of the 2008 reorganizational plan, a technical group, bringing together experts from all clusters, was established to develop strategies that better promote human rights aspects in all of the Executive Directorate's counter-terrorism activities. This group has been one of the most active in the Executive Directorate, having notably organized and delivered briefings to the Committee and arranged for visiting human rights experts to brief the Committee, as well as Executive Directorate staff.

26. As noted above, the Executive Directorate, through its dialogue with Member States, has become increasingly convinced that counter-terrorism strategies can be fully effective in the long term only if they are firmly grounded in the rule of law and comply with international human rights and humanitarian obligations. For this reason, the Executive Directorate always raises such issues in the course of country visits, video workshops and other exchanges, and sees future value in working more intensively with States on the practicalities of such approaches. The Executive Directorate believes that, although it is simply ineffective to lecture States about human rights, if the relevant national agencies can be convinced of the benefit of practical rule-of-law approaches (including those implemented through engagement with the community rather than through intimidation), and are persuaded that the country's overall counter-terrorism defences will be substantially enhanced as a result, they are much more likely to adopt such approaches.

27. The Executive Directorate continues to enhance its cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and UNHCR, including through joint development of relevant technical assistance for States in the human rights and refugee fields. The Executive Directorate has also established an active dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism and draws on his reports in preparing for assessment missions. With respect to broader outreach, the Executive Directorate should continue to act in accordance with the Committee's human rights policy guidance, which directs it to incorporate human rights into its communications strategy. This remains necessary, in part, in order to dispel misconceptions over the extent to which the Executive Directorate takes account of human rights in its work.

XI. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1624 (2005)

28. Security Council resolution 1624 (2005), which deals with the issue of incitement to terrorism, has grown in importance in the work of the Executive Directorate, as it provides a vehicle and a context for discussing with Member States their approaches and strategies with respect to the challenges of extremism and intolerance, particularly among youth. As noted above, it has become clear that

counter-terrorism measures are most effective when they are implemented in the context of a broad strategy that incorporates attention to the factors that contribute to extremism, including by ensuring that those involved in recruiting for terrorist groups or inciting terrorist acts are prevented or dissuaded from doing so. However, this is far from a simple exercise, not least because the national agencies that have traditionally worked in the counter-terrorism field (such as the police, immigration and Customs services and intelligence agencies), are not necessarily the agencies responsible for policies aimed at countering the appeal of extremist and hate-based ideologies. Indeed, the most effective implementers of such strategies in these areas are often not Government agencies at all, but rather civil society or religious authorities.

29. This reality poses significant challenges for most Governments and demonstrates the importance of establishing appropriate overarching national counter-terrorism mechanisms that can develop and help to implement a comprehensive national counter-terrorism strategy. Assisting States, with their consent, to develop such tools is an area in which the Executive Directorate hopes to devote future efforts, in addition to identifying and promoting good practices to address the issues of incitement to terrorism and countering incitement motivated by extremism and intolerance, as required both by resolution 1624 (2005) and by the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

XII. Public communications and outreach

30. The Executive Directorate has an active communications strategy that focuses on engagement with Member States, international organizations, relevant academic research institutions, civil society and the private sector with a view to enhancing their understanding of, and engagement with the Committee and the Executive Directorate. This work is being merged, to a certain extent, into the broader public communications approaches being coordinated through the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the Department of Public Information, which is an active member of the Task Force. Since for most purposes the United Nations needs to convey one common message on counter-terrorism, it is appropriate for the Task Force to take the lead in this respect, although the Executive Directorate will also need to maintain its independent public profile and ensure transparency as to its own procedures, as appropriate.

31. The Executive Directorate also maintains and constantly updates the Committee's website, which is user-friendly, informative and current. The website is completely revitalized on a periodic basis to better reflect the interests of Committee members. The website is also updated in all six official languages whenever updates are made to the English version. The Executive Directorate also maintains an up-to-date press kit, which is particularly useful during visits to States, during which it often engages with agencies that do not normally deal with the United Nations. The Executive Directorate has also made efforts to engage with the private sector, both to draw on its knowledge and experience in technical fields (for example the Internet) and to seek private sector support for counter-terrorism programmes in particular States.

XIII. Proposed future activities

32. Should the Security Council decide to renew its mandate, the Executive Directorate proposes to continue the approaches discussed above and to pursue initiatives already launched or planned. These include:

- Continuing to develop the South Asia police and prosecutors workshops
- Following-up on the East African border-control workshop through further, more specific initiatives in the subregion
- Continuing and expanding the programme of video workshops with capital-based officials from late-reporting States
- Replicating the model of the Nairobi workshop on border control in West Africa and southern Africa
- Organizing a workshop on Customs and maritime security in the Caribbean, co-hosted by the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, with a focus on cargo security and risk management
- Building on the Executive Directorate-OSCE Central Asian workshop to be held in November 2010 on resolution 1624 (2005) and countering incitement motivated by extremism, through similar initiatives in other regions
- Follow-up on the workshop of May 2010 on maritime security, organized jointly with IMO and the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Gabon, through specific initiatives for the subregion
- Following-up on the South-East Europe workshop on subregional cooperation in criminal justice matters held in October 2010, through activities that build on the workshop's conclusions
- Following-up on the prosecutors workshop to be held in December 2010, through activities that promote enhanced communication and a stronger network of prosecutors
- Continuing work to establish a South Asian law enforcement training centre
- Working to establish a regional counter-terrorism strategy and plan of action among ECOWAS States, supported by a unit within the ECOWAS Commission
- Organizing a special meeting of the Committee, bringing together relevant international, regional and subregional organizations of one specific region.

33. The Executive Directorate further proposes to work directly with States, with their consent, to develop broad and properly integrated national counter-terrorism strategies, as well as mechanisms to implement them. One recently visited country has indicated, in principle, its agreement to such an approach. The Executive Directorate would ensure that compliance with the provisions of resolution 1624 (2005) figures prominently in such strategies and mechanisms. Another area in which the Executive Directorate sees scope for further work is enhanced integration of human rights approaches into counter-terrorism programmes. Although the development of such approaches might most appropriately be carried out within the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and under the umbrella of the Global

Strategy, the Executive Directorate would be in a good position to "road test" them as they are developed.

XIV. Organization and operation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

34. The Executive Directorate believes that it currently has adequate staff to carry out an ambitious programme of activities under a new mandate, both in New York, in support of the Committee and in cooperation with its Task Force partners, and in the field, in conducting assessment visits, workshops and advisory missions to Member States.

35. The Executive Directorate proposes three minor adjustments to its organization and operational practice to reflect better its changed priorities and proposed new activities.

36. First, it proposes that one of the two D-1 positions no longer serve as a Head of Cluster. Instead, the D-1 would serve as the Deputy Head of the Assessment and Technical Assistance Office and as coordinator of a new unit, devoted to implementing special projects on a cross-cutting basis and having overall responsibility for organizing activities that involve particular liaison and logistical challenges.

37. Second, it proposes to send staff members on short-term assignments to carry out specific activities in the field, if appropriate resources are available. An example would be placing an Executive Directorate officer in the ECOWAS secretariat for several months to assist in the development of its subregional counter-terrorism strategy. It might also be possible to accept officers on secondment from international, regional and subregional organizations engaged with the Executive Directorate on common activities, for the duration of the activity in question (for example, organizing a conference or workshop).

38. Third, the Executive Directorate proposes that it be given the authority to accept extrabudgetary funds from donors for specific activities. As it currently has no such authority, it is obliged, each time it organizes an event (the South Asian or East African workshops, for example), to identify a partner organization that can hold and dispense donor funds. This has proved to be an adequate ad hoc arrangement, but as the Executive Directorate becomes more deeply engaged in such activities, there will be circumstances that dictate its management of a budget allocation and subsequent dispersal of the funds. It is proposed that the acceptance and use of extrabudgetary funds would be subject to the approval of the Committee, on a case-by-case basis.

XV. Conclusions

39. The Executive Directorate has continued to evolve, over the past three years, in response to the needs and wishes of the Committee and as its comparative advantage in the crowded international counter-terrorism field has become clearer. That comparative advantage lies, in part, in the fact that the Committee and the Executive Directorate, as subsidiary organs of the Security Council, carry the Council's full weight and authority. The Executive Directorate is thus able to

promote the importance of instituting counter-terrorism measures; help give legitimacy to such action, internationally, regionally and nationally; and encourage Governments to work with their neighbours so that their common counter-terrorism defences are as effective as possible. Moreover, as a body of technical experts, the Executive Directorate, working in close cooperation with partner organizations — whether specialized, regional or subregional — is able to offer sensible, impartial advice in a field that is fraught with real practical difficulties. The Executive Directorate believes that, in view of the ongoing and evolving threat posed to Member States by terrorism, this will continue to be important and relevant work.



**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
3 November 2010

Original: English

**General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session
Agenda item 43
Question of Cyprus**

**Security Council
Sixty-fifth year**

**Letter dated 2 November 2010 from the Permanent Representative
of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 1 November 2010, addressed to you by Kemal Gökçeri, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ertuğrul **Apakan**
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 2 November 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to convey herewith a copy of the letter dated 1 November 2010 addressed to you by Derviş Eroğlu, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Kemal **Gökeri**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Enclosure

I have the honour to refer to the speech made by the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Demetris Christofias, on 24 September 2010 during the sixty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Since, for reasons that are well known, the Turkish Cypriot side is deprived of a right of say in the General Assembly, I am obliged to respond to Mr. Christofias's allegations in writing. However, at a time when the negotiations for a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus are under way, and in keeping with the understanding that the parties should avoid mutual recriminations (i.e. the so-called "blame-game"), I will refrain from engaging in polemics with my Greek Cypriot counterpart and content myself with responding only to some of the main points in his address.

Mr. Christofias's reference to the Turkish intervention of 1974 as "invasion" and the subsequent presence of Turkish troops in the island as "occupation" reflects neither the legal nor the historical realities of the island. As you are well aware, none of the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus refers to the legitimate intervention of Turkey as "invasion" or its continued presence in the island as "occupation". The Turkish intervention of 1974 was perfectly legal under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and fully legitimate in view of the preceding Greek coup d'état aimed at annexing the island to Greece (*enosis*), which necessitated it.

Currently, Turkey's continued presence on the island is the only effective deterrent against a repetition of the atrocities and ethnic cleansing campaign perpetrated by the Greek Cypriot side against the Turkish Cypriots between 1963 and 1974. A belated admission on the historical facts of that period has recently come from a former Greek Cypriot leader, Mr. Glafkos Clerides, who reflected "We (Greek Cypriots) believed that the Turkish Cypriots would surrender if we isolated them in enclaves. ... this was a major mistake".

What was not mentioned, however, is that with that treatment of the Turkish Cypriots and their accompanying forced expulsion from all organs of the partnership State, the Republic of Cyprus as a legitimate bicomunal State had ceased to exist. The continued claim, after 1963, of the Greek Cypriot side to the title of the "Republic of Cyprus" is devoid of any legal, factual or moral basis; that Republic represents neither the Turkish Cypriot people nor the whole of Cyprus.

Notwithstanding the above, the Turkish Cypriot side, in the decades-long negotiating process, has always acted in good faith and either initiated or accepted major plans for a settlement. The latest instance of this was the Annan Plan presented by your predecessor, which was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots but rejected by the Greek Cypriots in the separate, simultaneous referenda of April 2004.

As you are well aware, our constructive stance at the negotiating table has continued throughout the current process. We have recently presented proposals on the chapter of property, currently under discussion, that are regarded by all concerned as creative, positive and constructive. To improve the atmosphere of the negotiations and help build confidence, among other things, we cancelled the annual military exercises that we hold jointly with the Republic of Turkey. With a reciprocal forward-looking approach from the Greek Cypriot side and demonstration

of political will, we believe it is possible to make progress, even reach a comprehensive settlement by the end of the year.

I, therefore, call upon the Greek Cypriot side to concentrate its efforts on the negotiating table rather than engaging in unnecessary rhetoric; pretending that it is Turkey that is its counterpart in the current process; and resorting to diversionary tactics such as raising the subject of Maras (Varosha), which is part and parcel of a comprehensive settlement.

I would, finally, like to take this opportunity to reiterate that, as I told you in our recent telephone conversation, I gladly accept coming together with you and Mr. Christofias in a tripartite meeting in New York, under your auspices, with a view to adding impetus to the talks and achieving progress, with the sincere hope that the meeting will produce positive results.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Derviş **Eroğlu**
President